天星传奇:在哪里可以找到对华生行为主义的批判（英文）

不知道行不行，我对心理学实在一窍不通！

楼主也可以自己找一下：
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=zh-CN&lr=&newwindow=1&q=John+Broadus+Watson+behaviorism+criticism&lr=

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Behaviourism: The Early Years[1]

Robert H. Wozniak[2]
Bryn Mawr College

In 1913, in one of the most famous lectures[3] in the history of psychology, John Broadus Watson (1878-1958)[4], a 35-year-old "animal behavior man" from Johns Hopkins University, called for a radical revisioning of the scope and method of psychological research.:

"Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation."[5]
Introspection was to be abandoned in favor of the study of behavior. Behavior was to be evaluated in its own right, independent of its relationship to any consciousness that might exist. The concept of "consciousness" was to be rejected as an interpretive standard and eschewed as an explanatory device. As an objective, natural science, psychology was to make no sharp distinction between human and animal behavior; and its goal was to develop principles by which behavior could be predicted and controlled.

Published in the Psychological Review shortly after its delivery and incorporated within the first chapter of Watson's 1914 Behavior: A Textbook of Comparative Psychology[6], this lecture eventually came to be known as the "behaviorist manifesto." Generations of psychologists, reared in a post-Watsonian discipline that defined itself as the "science of behavior," were taught that Watson was the father of behaviorism and that February 24, 1913 was the day on which modern behaviorism was born.[7]

There is, of course, some truth to this. On that fateful day in 1913, Watson did reject the mainstream view, and he did do so in uncompromising terms. An indefatigable and effective self-publicist fond of referring to himself in the third person as "the behaviorist," Watson then embarked on a personal campaign to change the face of psychological science. Using his public position as a professor of psychology at Hopkins, editor of several of the field's most influential journals[8],and contributor to the popular press, he labored ceaselessly on behalf of his behavioristic vision[9]. Even when his career as an academic psychologist was abruptly and involuntarily cut short in 1920[10], Watson continued to press his case. By the time he left the field for good in the early 1930s, behaviorism had succeeded in taking center stage within American psychology.

Like many origin myths, however, the story of Watson's founding of behaviorism is oversimplified and misleading. Watson was by no means the first to criticize psychology's use of the concept of "consciousness" or the method of introspection; his was not even the first attempt to rid psychology of "consciousness" altogether or to argue the case against all use of introspection[11]. Watson was not the first to use objective, experimental methods in the study of behavior[12], or to propose a unitary scheme for the investigation of animal and human response.[13] Indeed, even prediction and control of behavior had been articulated as worthy goals of psychological science prior to Watson's manifesto of 1913.[14]

What happened in 1913, then, was not novel; it was not a sharp break with the past. Nor did it create an immediate revolution. As Samelson has described it:[15]

"Supported by the Zeitgeist, Behaviorism supposedly spread quickly through psychology after the publication of Watson's manifesto in 1913. But an extensive search of published and unpublished source material from 1913 to 1920 shows only limited support and a good deal of resistance; documentary evidence for the conversion of psychologists to radical behaviorism during these years is hard to find. Though faced with some troubling problems, the discipline was not eager to renounce its established scientific authority and expertise on the mind."[16]
Yet behaviorism did eventually spread throughout American psychology. During the 1920s, across the work of a growing number of psychologists, there emerged a reasonably coherent set of intellectual commitments to which the name "behaviorism" gradually became attached. Based on the rejection of mentalism in psychological theory, a dedication to the use of objective methodology in research, and a strong concern with practical application of psychological knowledge to the prediction and control of behavior, "behaviorism" in the 1920s owed an obvious debt to Watson.

At the same time, however, behaviorism grew during this period in part by diverging from and transcending Watson. Influenced by broader conceptions of objectivism and of psychological process developing at Harvard, Columbia, Chicago, Missouri, Ohio State, Minnesota, North Carolina, and even Hopkins, behaviorism had become, by the end of the 1920s, a more thoroughly elaborated, theoretically more varied and sophisticated approach than anything to be found in Watson's own writings.[17] It was this richer version of behaviorism, rather than Watsonianism per se, that succeeded in transforming American psychology; and it did so not by converting the old guard but by capturing the enthusiasm of the young. As succeeding generations of psychologists entered the discipline, objectivism gradually became the norm; and by the mid-1930s, American psychology had become the science of behavior, and behaviorism, methodological and/or theoretical, had become its dominant orientation.

Early behaviorism, then, was a complex affair. On the one hand, much of the program for which its stood was not exclusively its own. This was noted as early as 1924 by no less a figure than Robert Sessions Woodworth (1869-1962).[18] Identifying a small set of intellectual commitments presumed by some to define behaviorism-objectivism, reliance on an animal behavior research program, neuromechanical reductionism, an emphasis on social process-Woodworth correctly pointed out that such commitments were common to psychologists of varying persuasions. Indeed, many who referred to themselves as functionalists, pragmatists, and objectivists would have and did find much in the behaviorist program with which they could still agree.

On the other hand, even among those who identified themselves as "behaviorists," agreement on the program was by no means unanimous. Early behaviorism took a variety of forms[19]. There was, of course, the radical behaviorism of Watson, a view notable for its extreme anti-mentalism, its radical reduction of thinking to implicit response, and, especially after 1916, its heavy and somewhat simplistic theoretical reliance on conditioned reactions.[20] There was the relational behaviorism of the Harvard group, developed by Edwin Bissell Holt (1873-1946)[21] under the influence of William James (1842-1910) and transmitted, at least in part, to students such as Floyd Henry Allport (1890-1978) [22], and Edward Chace Tolman (1886-1959)[23]. Conceiving of behavior as "a course of action which the living body executes or is prepared to execute with regard to some object or fact of its environment,"[24] Holt's behaviorism was molar, purposive and focused on the relationship between high-level behavioral mechanisms in the organism and the concrete realities of the social and physical environment. Closely related to this view was a kind of philosophical behaviorism, espoused primarily by philosophers and tied to pragmatism, in which "consciousness" was defined as a form of behavior guided by future results.[25]

At Ohio State, under the influence of his mentor, Max Frederick Meyer (1873-1967), Albert Paul Weiss (1879-1931) was developing a bio-social behaviorism based on a radical distinction between the level of theoretical discourse appropriate to behavior analyzed as social cause (i.e., "biosocially") and that appropriate to behavior analyzed as sensorimotor effect (i.e., "biophysically").[26] In Baltimore, Knight Dunlap (1875-1949)[27], who had been both a Harvard graduate student with Holt and Watson's former departmental colleague at Johns Hopkins, was articulating a reaction psychology that blended attacks on introspection, instinct, and images, with an "insistence on response or reaction as the basis of mental processes, including thought processes [and consciousness]."[28]

At Minnesota, Karl Spencer Lashley (1890-1958) was arguing a physiological behaviorism in which the physiological analysis of behavior could be considered "a complete and adequate account of all the phenomena of consciousness."[29] At the University of Chicago, George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), who had been on the faculty since Watson was a graduate student, was elaborating a social behaviorism of mind, meaning, self, language, and thinking that emphasized the social character of behavior and the behavioral character of mind[30]. Finally, in a number of institutions, a sort of eclectic behaviorism was emerging-a behaviorism that assimilated whatever seemed strongest and most reliable in the views of others. This was the sort of behaviorism to be found in a text such as Dashiell's Fundamentals of Objective Psychology.[31]

Early Behaviorism as an Orientation to Psychology

As it existed during this period, behaviorism clearly resisted simple definition. Early behaviorism was not simple. It was complex, varied, and changing. Yet there was a common core within this variability-a definite movement away from certain ideas and practices and toward others. If early behaviorism could not be simply defined, it could nonetheless be broadly characterized in terms of a constellation of features including intellectual commitments concerning the nature of psychology as science and the fundamental nature of behavior and a set of theoretical and research emphases that followed directly from such commitments. It is this constellation of commitments and emphases, taken together, that gave early behaviorism its distinctive orientation. As context for the foundational monographs and papers reprinted in this series, the remainder of this introduction will be devoted to an analysis of this orientation.

Level 1 Commitments-The Nature of Psychology as Science.

Psychology as a natural science. More than anything else, early behaviorism was committed to the assumption that physical processes and only physical processes play a causal role in the determination of psychological phenomena. The procedures of scientific psychology are the procedures of any science. As Dashiell put it: "A scientific study of man assumes that he is a complex physical object moving in a world of physical energies and relationships. Anything of psychological interest about man is to be treated as a physical phenomenon...as a natural occurrence in which material bodies effect energy changes...the events with which we are concerned are continuous with, and similar to, all other events in the world of nature." [32]

Whether or not "consciousness" had any role to play in psychology as a natural science depended, for a given theorist, on how consciousness was construed. If consciousness was either reconceptualized in terms of physical processes or construed as an epiphenomenal (albeit psychical) byproduct of physical process, it was typically included within psychology as a datum although never as an explanation. While behaviorists in this period were of several minds on how to treat consciousness, they were absolutely united in rejecting any notion of non-material, psychical determinism of the sort implied in the traditional concept of "consciousness." Weiss was especially forceful in making this point. Behaviorism, he asserted, is "a protest against all attempts to explain human achievement by the introduction of an element which is beyond the range of physical measurement. [...] On this basis human behavior, human conduct, human achievement, human personality, are regarded as belonging to the same phenomenological categories as those which now form the subject of physics, chemistry, biology, in their strictly mechanical interpretations..." [33]

As a natural science, psychology takes the study of behavior as its fundamental task. Whatever else psychology might be, for early behaviorism it was fundamentally the science of behavior, where behavior was defined in terms of the organism's organized response to stimulation. Depending on the theorist and the reaction system in question, response might be overt or covert, implicit or explicit, clear and well-defined or vague and obscure, molecular or molar, simple or complex. Response might consist of an actual act or simply of the adoption of an attitude, tendency, or set; it might be controlled by the proximal stimulus or directed toward objects in the environment. But however otherwise conceived, for the behaviorist, response involved the operation of effector systems-muscles and glands. Behavior, as Dashiell indicated, had to do with "how, when, and why a man does this or that, acts thus and so, desires, seeks, accepts, rejects-in a word, moves."[34]

As a natural science, psychology is committed to methodological objectivism. As scientists, behaviorists focused on objective, behavioral methods. Although they were by no means the first to emphasize objective methodology in the study of psychological function,[35] objective methods were the cornerstone on which they hoped to build their scientific edifice. In this spirit, Watson devoted an entire chapter in Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist to "objective methods as employed in human psychology"[36] and Dashiell informed his students that: "The methods of psychological investigation differ no whit in their essential character from the various methods employed in other natural sciences."[37]

As a natural science, psychology is committed to increasing scientific understanding of behavior for the purpose of prediction and control. For early behaviorism, the science of behavior was to lay the groundwork for a behavior technology. Just as behaviorists were not the first objectivists, neither were they the first psychologists to emphasize the application of psychological insight in practical human affairs. From the outset, however, behaviorism defined the goal of scientific psychology in terms (prediction and control) that led naturally to questions concerning the relevance of behavior mechanisms (e.g., habit formation) to everyday life.[38] As Watson described it in 1919, "...the goal of psychological study is the ascertaining of such data and laws that, given the stimulus, psychology can predict what the responses will be; or, on the other hand, given the response, it can specify the nature of the effective stimulus."[39] The early behaviorists were convinced that with such information in hand, "the twentieth century...[would] become remarkable for the development of psycho-technology."[40]

Level 2 Commitments-The Fundamental Nature of Behavior as Subject Matter for Scientific Psychology

Adjustment and maladjustment. In the 1920s, behaviorists were united in the assumption that behavior results when the organism's relationship to the environment must be changed if it is to survive and prosper. Behaviorism referred to such states as "maladjustments" and conceived of the occurrence of maladjustment as the "sine qua non" for behavior.[41] Maladjustment is a natural byproduct of change in the organism (e.g., an increase in drive level) or in the environment (e.g., a rise in ambient air temperature); and behavior, which is a process of adjustment, consists of responses on the part of the organism that tend to restore balance in its relationship to the environment.

Phylogenetic continuity. For early behaviorism, animal and human behavior exist in an "unbroken continuity,"[42] Animals and humans share both mechanisms and fundamental forms of overt adjustment to the environment. This view, which originated with Watson's desire to place the study of animal behavior high on the psychological research agenda,[43] was reinforced by psychology's early success in extending trial-and-error and conditioning analyses from animals to humans. As Dashiell summarized the continuity commitment: "The genus and species Homo sapiens is moved by the same forces without and within as are the lower animal forms, and expresses them in the same general types of actions and action-tendencies. The differences are differences in degree..."[44]

The Determination of Behavior. Behavior, from a behaviorist point of view, is a joint function of stimulating conditions in the environment and characteristics (drive states, hereditary reflexes, acquired systems of habit, emotions, mechanisms of implicit stimulation) within the organism. In its earliest formulations, this commitment, from which behaviorism later became known as "stimulus-response" or "S-R" psychology, was somewhat too simply phrased. Thus, for example, in 1919, Watson said only that: "In each adjustment there is always both a response or-act and a stimulus or situation which call [sic] out that response....the stimulus is always provided by the environment, external to the body, or by the movements of man's own muscles and the secretions of his glands...[and] responses always follow relatively immediately upon the presentation or incidence of the stimulus."[45]

Throughout the 1920's, however, as the importance of drive states, the complexity of habit systems, and the implications of the concept of response-produced stimulation-the notion that every response of the organism, even those that are covert, is also a stimulus to further response-were more fully worked out, the S-R formulation became more sophisticated. In 1928, Dashiell characterized the state of the art in the following fashion: "...not all of a man's activity is directly excited from without...His conduct is just as much the expression of his own internal energies with all their traces of previous environmental influences and of his modes of response thereto [...] One thing should be clear...the conception of a simple stimulus leading to a simple response is only a convenient abstraction from the actual facts. [...] S X O->R (in which O represents these organic factors) would be a more adequate formula."[46]

he Classification of Behavior. Although many behaviorists pointed to the indissociability of response types in actual behavior, early behaviorism remained wedded to the classification of response in terms of three major categories: a) somatic/hereditary (pre-potent reflexes, instinctive reaction tendencies); b) somatic/acquired (systems of habits); or c) visceral/hereditary and acquired (emotions). Responses in all three categories were then further classified as explicit, implicit, or preparatory (attitudinal).

Distinctions between instinctive, habitual, and emotional reaction systems were delineated by Watson in 1919.[47] "Human action as a whole," he wrote. "can be divided into hereditary...(emotional and instinctive), and acquired modes of response (habit)."[48] For Watson, all three response modes were "pattern reactions," complex systems of reflexes that function in an organized fashion when the organism is confronted with an appropriate stimulus.

Although behaviorists recognized that emotional reactions might involve somatic elements (e.g., facial expressions),

（1）心理学的对象不是意识而是行为。华生格守一般科学所共有的客观性基本原则。他的行为主义心理学的基本特点是否认传统心理学的对象——心理或意识，而代之以行为。所谓行为，乃是有机体用以适应环境变化的各种身体反应的组合。华生曾把人的反应区分为外观习惯反应（如开门、打球）、内隐习惯反应（如思维，即无声语言）、外观遗传反应（如眨眼、抓握）和内隐遗传反应（如内分泌腺的分泌）。华生把心理或意识归结为内隐而轻微的行为。他指出，一向认为纯属意识的思维和情绪，其实也都是内隐和轻微的身体变化。思维是全身肌肉，特别是喉头肌肉的内在和轻微的反应。事实上，他把“思维”和“喉头的习惯”视作同义词。情绪是身体机构特别是内脏和腺体的变化，是内隐、轻微行为的一种形式。华生自称行为主义是唯一彻底而合乎逻辑的机能主义。按机能主义的哲学依据——实用主义来说，检验意识适应性的唯一标准只能是行为的适应性。既然行为主义是彻底的机能主义，那它就当然可以丢开意识去考察行为，而不能丢开行为去考察意识。

（2）心理学的任务在于预测和控制行为。华生认为构成行为的基础是个体表现于外的反应，但反应的形成与改变则归因于有机体所受的刺激，反应紧随刺激出现。这便导致了刺激—反应的简化的行为公式。华生在其《行为：比较心理学导论》一书中写道：“人和动物的全部行为都可以分析为刺激与反应”。他认为最基本的刺激—反应联结叫做反射。不管多么复杂的行为总不外乎是一套反射而已。华生强调心理学必须符合一般科学共有的预测、控制的基本原则。心理学研究行为的任务就在于查明刺激与反应之间的规律性关系，从而根据刺激预知反应或根据反应谁知刺激，以预测和控制动物和人的行为。

（3）心理学的研究方法应该是客观的方法而不是内省法。华生研究心理学抛弃传统的内省法代之以客观的方法的原因，固然是他不相信内省法的精确性，但也是他在心理学对象上否定意识的必然结果。他清楚地说过的客观方法有四种，即应用和不应用仪器控制的观察、条件反射法、言语报告法和测验法。条件反射法是行为主义者最重要的研究方法。华生在其著作中曾因为条件作用方法而感激巴甫洛夫和别赫捷列夫。他用“刺激替代”的术语来描述条件作用。他说当一种反应同一个并非原来引起它的刺激联结起来时，那么这个反应就成为有条件的（巴甫洛夫实验中的狗听见铃声而不是看见食物就分泌唾液，就是一种条件反应）。华生非常赞赏巴甫洛夫的条件反射法，因为这种方法可使像感觉辨别这样的主观经验转化为反应差异的客观事实。条件反射法使华生掌握了一种完全客观的分析行为的方法。华生强烈地反对内省法，但有人批评他把言语报告法作为客观方法之一，是他将内省法从前门猛烈地扔出以后，又以言语报告法从后门拾了回来。他把言语报告法列为客观方法之一，是把言语当作反应来看待的，所以听取别人在接受某种刺激后的言语反应，并不违反行为主义所坚持的客观原则。值得注意的是华生希望严格地把言语报告法的使用限制在能够加以证实的情境中。

（4）个体的行为不是先天遗传的，而是后天环境决定的。华生关于先天遗传在行为中作用的立场，是从最初接受先天遗传的作用改变到断然否定先天遗传的作用的。这后一立场是在1925年宣布的。他认为行为最后都可分析还原为由刺激引起的反应，而刺激不可能来自先天遗传，所以行为当然就不可能来自先天遗传了。他认为人类行为中所有那些似乎像本能行为的方面，实际上都是在社会中形成的条件反应。他在《托儿所对本能应提供的证词》（1925）一文中断言“在人类的反射目录中，找不出哪一种相当于心理学家和生物学家所说的本能”。华生认为后天环境对行为具有压倒一切的影响。不管孩子出生时如何，只要控制环境，就能训练孩子成为我们所期望的人。他曾在婴儿的情绪行为上作了实验，使婴儿的爱、惧通过条件反射的改变而改变。他提出建立行为主义的实验伦理学。华生成了环境决定论和教育万能论者。

疯了！